(57) Cause of accident: UNKNOWN

A VERY DIFFERENT TIME:

My research brought me to many old newspaper articles, government reports, and correspondence written during the war year of 1943. It became apparent from the beginning that the airplane incident could not, and should not, be removed from its time and place in history. It was a very different time in the U.S., with vastly different priorities, and technologies. The war effort was not going well and the Army was frantically trying to train pilots and crews for both the Pacific and European fronts. If you read some of the correspondence and conversation transcripts contained in the government file (see Official Government Report Index ) you will readily see how these factors contributed and may have influenced the misfortune of 29828.

VERY DIFFERENT AGENDAS

Four basic sources of information were used in researching this event:

1. Word of mouth - which proved to be mostly inaccurate.

2. Articles from four local newspapers.

3. Government reports and transcripts.

4. My own observations after visiting the scene of the crash.

The character of these sources are very different and each has it's own particular agenda.

The "word of mouth" source has proven mostly inaccurate mainly due to the lack any reliable information from the beginning. People have simply "added their own facts" or "filled in the blanks" to make a more interesting and exciting story. One notable exception to this resulted from an interview I had the privilege to make with one gentlemen who actually visited the crash scene early on the morning of February 3, 1943. He gave me valuable first hand observations that helped reconcile some of the conflicting issues.

The media, then as today, mainly was interested in providing information that their customers would want to read. The newspaper articles reported the human and spectacular aspects of the event. For example, one articles tells of a body being decapitated and the head not located. Blood and gore were emphasized. These articles, however, may be more valuable in unraveling what really happened than the Government reports. It also seems as though the media might have been given some misleading information by the Army. This comes to light now, only after declassification of the Government file dealing with the crash.

The government reports and transcripts seem to have been filtered in just the opposite direction. All human aspects were taken out and the accident was reduced to facts and forms. It becomes evident that the government did little more than "go through the motions " in order to satisfy their own minimal requirement. This becomes apparent when you consider that the complete investigation took less than two weeks, and most of this time was taken up by the "paper trail" of various reports and forms. A real analysis of what actually happened and the reasons behind the accident was apparently never made. Or, if it was made, it was suppressed. Blame was never formally placed on a person or factor. It was, however, implied that the pilot was at fault. I was very surprised by some of the conversation transcripts within the government file. Surprised by their content as well as the fact that they exist. Some of the information could be very damaging if taken out of context. The file itself is somewhat of a paradox, in that it seems to suppress information in one direction while airing "dirty laundry" in other directions.

My observations of the scene, some fifty plus years after the fact, are important only in that they have given me a better awareness of the devastation, and remoteness of the crash site.

THE NIGHT OF FEBRUARY 2, 1943

The night of February 2, 1943 was not a good one for the Army Air Force and especially bad for those who dealt with aviation accidents. That night they found themselves dealing with three different airplane crashes within a 300-mile radius. The B-25 on Sharp Top Mountain was the most devastating of the three, with all crew members killed and the plane a total loss. Major Reid (assigned to Headquarters in Washington DC and apparently working out of an office in Winston Salem, N.C.) received the initial report of the downed airplane. The government file contains extensive telephone transcripts of his conversation as he handled the emergency. His first contact was with the Chief of Police in Bedford Virginia (Captain Johnson) which confirmed the identity of the downed craft and that all onboard were dead. I found the transcripts fascinating. He then went about trying to find an Army Air Force unit that could "take care of " the incident, but with little success. All units were busy dealing with prior crashes. Finally, after many telephone calls he gave responsibility for recovery of the wreckage to Richmond Army Air Base. It was understood that Richmond could not immediately deal with this task, in that they were busy recovering wreckage at their own base. My impression from reading through the file was that Major Reid basically was left "holding the bag" and could not persuade any of the "routine" channels to take responsibility. He reluctantly agreed to have his men obtain all the needed information from witnesses in Bedford, arrange for civilian guards to stay at the crash scene, and make arrangements for a local mortuary in Bedford to take care of the bodies. We can thank Major Reid for the many detailed transcripts, he must have had a staff that could take dictation and type.

WEATHER CONDITIONS

From most indications weather was not a direct factor in the crash of 29828. The abbreviation "CAVU" appears in several reports - Ceiling and Visibility Unlimited. No mention of weather being a factor appears in any of the government witness reports or newspaper accounts. However, several recount being able to see lights inside the plane's cockpit (apparently reading lights) and at least one report tells of watching the craft up to the moment of impact on Sharp Top Mountain. The explosion and fire could also be seen clearly from Bedford as well as some "green" lights - flares ignited by the explosion. Apparently the visibility was excellent. It can also be ascertained that the night of February 2, 1943 was very cold and some ice and snow remained on the ground. The icy condition was mentioned by several reports as it related to the difficulty it caused in reaching the crash scene and in recovering the bodies. This condition was undoubtedly much worse on Sharp Top, due to the increased altitude.

The snow and ice covering on the ground could possibly have decreased visibility from the air. If Sharp Top was covered with a blanket of "white" it would have blended into the surrounding area and the crew might not have seen the mountain until it was too late. This would be especially true at night. There was no indication of the pilot taking any evasive action prior to impact.

Several witnesses recounted, some years later, that the Sharp Top area was shrouded in a heavy fog the night of the crash. These were reports from people living at the base of the mountain. It's hard to reconcile these seemingly contradictory reports. Perhaps patchy fog existed around the mountain base and into the valleys and coves. It would have seemed to these witnesses, from their vantage point, that the whole mountain was obscured.

ENGINE PROBLEMS

It's interesting that some witness reports indicate that the aircraft was experiencing engine difficulty and others comment on how well the engines were performing. Both accounts were based on direct observation from approximately the same location. It is also noteworthy that the Government did not mention any of the reported equipment problems in the official report - it only included the accounts that gave the engines a clean bill of health. I wonder if the reports of engine problems could have been influenced by the fact that the craft was flying at such a low altitude. Engine trouble might have been "assumed" by some witnesses. From weighing all of the reports, I must agree with the Army in that engine trouble was not a factor.

Another fact should be considered. The ship was flying extremely light, with no cargo or bomb load. I doubt if even the machine guns were on board. This "unloaded" condition would have provided a wide margin for error in engine performance. The craft's chances of survival should have been good even with one of the engines malfunctioning. No radio report of equipment trouble was made.

There are conflicting reports of whether or not the plane circled the Bedford area prior to impact with the mountain. Both versions are equally convincing, however the government determined (somehow) that the plane did not circle prior to the crash. From reviewing all of the material and talking with actually witnesses I must agree with the government report. The plane apparently was flying a straight course when it impacted.

MISSION AND FLIGHT PLAN

The official mission for the flight was listed as "Night navigation training". The flight plan estimated the flight to last for approximately three hours and ten minutes: The plane was to depart from Columbia Army Air Force field in South Carolina , fly over Florence, S.C. and Raleigh N.C.; turn around over Lynchburg, VA. and pass over Greensboro, N.C. before returning to Columbia. The last contact with the plane was at 2058 (8:58 P.M.) when it passed over Raleigh -- no other contact was made. The above flight plan can be found several times in various forms and correspondence within the government file.

MYSTERY

Why did the aircraft fly over Bedford? The official flight plan did not call for an over-flight of the city. Witness reports indicated that the plane approached the town from the South and flew due North. Apparently the aircraft proceeded from Raleigh directly to Bedford and never made it to Lynchburg. It could be assumed the pilot and navigator were lost and possibly mistook the lights of Bedford for what they thought was Lynchburg. This, however, raises another question. If they thought they had arrived at Lynchburg why did they not make a turn. Their flight plan called for a 180-degree turn at Lynchburg to put them on a heading for Greensboro. The craft was reported flying straight and level when it struck Sharp Top. Lights were also reported in the plane's cockpit. This could have been due to confusion as to their location. The crew could have been looking at charts or maps.

The most probable scenario, however, would be that the crew thought they were over Altavista when they passed over Bedford. Altavista and Bedford were approximately the same size towns. If the pilot was relying on visual navigation, Altavista would have been his last landmark prior to arriving at Lynchburg (which is approximately twenty miles North of Altavista). This would explain why they did not make a turn. They were still looking for the lights of Lynchburg to appear on the horizon when they struck the mountain.

Why was the airplane flying at such a low altitude? The plane hit Sharp Top at an altitude of approximately 2,800 to 3,000 feet above sea level. The bomber must have passed over Bedford flying less than 2,000 feet above the local terrain. There are several mountains around the Bedford, Lynchburg, and Roanoke areas that are approximately 4,000 feet high. Why would a pilot choose to fly so close to the ground, at night, in mountainous terrain? Only a few hundred feet of additional altitude would have saved this flight. They could have cleared the part of Sharp Top where they impacted at approximately 3,200 feet. Several clues are contained within the Army file that shine light on this part of the puzzle.

We don't know the exact nature of the flight plan, as presented to the crew in their briefing prior to departing Columbia airfield. The accident report listed the mission as "night navigation training". However, one of the safety recommendations that came out of this accident used the phrase "mission under contact conditions". Thus a more accurate description of their mission would be "low level, visual contact, night navigation training mission". This would account for such low altitude. The pilot was qualified for instrument flying, but just barely -- he had only a total of 18.5 hours of instrument time logged.

The key to solving this mystery seems to rest more with the safety recommendations resulting from the accident than the actual accident report. The major items in the safety report are:

1. That all pilots and crews dispatched on night navigational missions under contact conditions be dispatched at an altitude to include by a least two thousand feet all obstacles between point of departure and destination, and surroundings including beyond destination for a distance of one hundred miles.

2. That pilot and co-pilot be specifically warned on night navigational missions to use reading lights only when absolutely necessary, to avoid temporary blindness.

3. That operations officers thoroughly brief trainees in the terrain covered by the mission including the one hundred miles area beyond destination, and that trainees be informed that in emergency such as becoming lost, that additional altitude be obtained if there are obstacles still higher in surrounding areas.

It appears, at least to me, that the responsibility for the crash of 29828 rests more with the Army planners and chain of command than with the pilot and crew. When all of the facts are considered, the real cause of the accident is far from "Unknown". The pilot and his crew were dealt a very poor hand, that night of February 2, 1943. Look again at the names, ages, and experience level of this crew.

The above safety recommendations equate to little more than basic common sense. It's almost unbelievable to imagine these simple and basic elements of safety being overlooked and not in place as routine procedures. However, as I stated in the beginning, it would be a mistake to remove this incident from its time and place in history. A world war was being fought and aviation itself was still young. The telephone conversation between Major Reid and Major Cleveland, at Richmond Air Base on February 4, 1943, explains quite clearly the general conditions that existed during this period of American history and some of the factors that contributed to this and other accidents. I strongly recommend you read this transcript.

It is fruitless to search for blame. It is important to realize what adverse circumstance our service men endured and ultimately overcame during these war years.

 We salute this brave crew. They served their country well, and we will not forget them!

Don Yeargin

October 8, 1999